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Assessing the Performance of Alternative Water and Sanitation    
Tariffs: The Case of Nairobi, Kenya 
David Fuente, Jane Kabubo-Mariara, Peter Kimuyu, Mbutu Mwaura, and Dale Whittington 
Abstract 
Policy makers and utility managers can use a variety of tariff structures to calculate customers’ 
bills for water and sanitation services, ranging from a simple flat monthly fee to complicated multipart 
tariffs with seasonal pricing based on metered water use. This paper examines the performance of 
alternative tariff structures for water and wastewater services in Nairobi, Kenya. In particular, we 
evaluate the performance of alternative tariffs relative to several criteria: the overall quantity of water 
sold (i.e., conservation), the magnitude of the total subsidy delivered through the tariff, subsidy 
incidence, change in customer welfare, and change in social welfare. To accomplish this, we develop a 
dynamic tariff simulation model and use a complete set of billing records from Nairobi City Water and 
Sewer Company to model the performance of alternative tariff structures. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, we find that tariff alternatives with a uniform volumetric price perform as well as or better than 
increasing block tariff alternatives across nearly all policy-relevant metrics of tariff performance. These 
findings hold at the three levels of cost recovery that we consider and are robust to a wide range of 
assumptions about consumer behavior. This finding stands in stark contrast to the widespread use of 
increasing block tariffs (IBTs) in low and middle-income countries and to current perceptions of best 
practice in tariff design. Additionally, we find that neither the size of the lifeline block nor the number 
of blocks affects the relative performance of the IBT tariff alternatives in a policy-relevant manner. 
Finally, our simulations underscore the benefits of getting utilities on a path to improved cost recovery. 
This will be essential to ensuring governments have the resources to invest in climate resilient 
infrastructure and to meet the Sustainable Development Goals’ aspiration of ensuring universal access 
to safe water and sanitation services. 
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Assessing the Performance of Alternative Water and Sanitation 
Tariffs: The Case of Nairobi, Kenya 
David Fuente, Jane Kabubo-Mariara, Peter Kimuyu, Mbutu Mwaura, and Dale 
Whittington∗ 
1. Introduction 
Policy makers and utility managers can use a variety of tariff structures to 
calculate customers’ bills for water and sanitation services, ranging from a simple fixed 
monthly fee to complicated multipart tariffs with seasonal pricing based on metered water 
use. Faced with such a wide range of options, what tariff should policy makers use? 
Further, once they have decided on a particular tariff structure, how should they set water 
prices? Economists and development practitioners have debated these questions for 
decades. However, the issue of pricing municipal water and sanitation services has 
renewed significance given the aspiration of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
to ensure universal access to safe and affordable water and sanitation services, as well as 
the challenges posed by climate change. Indeed, tariff reform in many developing 
countries will play a central role in determining whether or not utilities are able to 
generate the revenue and acquire the financing necessary to achieve universal access to 
resilient water and sanitation services.   
In this paper, we develop a framework for simulating the performance of water 
and sanitation tariffs with respect to several policy-relevant criteria. We then apply this 
framework to the case of Nairobi, Kenya, a rapidly growing city with conditions similar 
to those of many large cities in low- and middle-income countries. In particular, we 
examine the performance of five alternative tariff structures relative to the current tariff 
implemented by Nairobi City Water and Sewer Company (NCWSC) at three different 
levels of cost recovery. We then evaluate the performance of alternative tariffs relative to 
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several criteria associated with tariff performance, including the overall quantity of water 
sold (i.e., conservation), the magnitude of the total subsidy delivered through the tariff, 
subsidy incidence, and changes in social welfare.  
Our analysis extends the literature on tariff performance in several ways. First, the 
majority of studies in the literature focus on industrialized countries and examine one or 
two indicators of tariff performance. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine 
the performance of water and sanitation tariffs relative to a broad portfolio of policy-
relevant criteria in a low- or middle-income country context. Second, we explicitly 
compare the performance of a suite of increasing block tariffs (IBTs) to tariffs that 
implement a uniform volumetric price. Finally, in contrast to many studies in the 
literature, we simulate the performance of tariff alternatives over a five-year planning 
horizon and consider the performance of tariffs under uncertainty about consumer 
behavior.  
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that tariff alternatives with a uniform 
volumetric price perform at least as well as IBT tariff alternatives at the three levels of 
cost recovery we consider. The uniform pricing alternatives include both a two-part tariff 
long promoted by economists (i.e., a uniform price with rebate) as well as a simple tariff 
in which customers face a uniform volumetric price. These findings are robust to 
assumptions about whether customers respond to average or marginal price. Overall, our 
findings add to a growing body of evidence that challenges commonly held perceptions 
about IBTs and suggest that considerable gains can be realized by getting utilities on a 
path to improved cost recovery. 
2. Background and Literature 
A water tariff is a set of rules by which a utility calculates how much customers 
need to pay on a regular basis (monthly, bi-monthly, etc.) in exchange for a specified 
level of service. A wide variety of tariff structures can be used to charge customers for 
water and sanitation services. Tariffs used to calculate the volumetric portion of 
customers’ water and wastewater bills include increasing block tariffs (IBTs), decreasing 
block tariffs, and uniform price tariffs. Despite the diversity of tariff structures at policy 
makers’ disposal, the IBT is the most widely implemented tariff among water utilities in 
low- and middle-income countries (GWI 2013). The IBT has widespread appeal due to 
the perception that it can subsidize water use for low-income households, while 
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simultaneously recovering costs and promoting conservation among high-income 
customers (Whittington et al. 2015; Fuente et al. 2016).  
The popularity of the IBT reflects the fact that policy makers often try to use the 
tariff to achieve, and balance, a wide range of policy objectives. Bonbright (1961) 
presented an early articulation of eight core objectives of tariff setting: simplicity and 
public acceptability, freedom from controversy, revenue stability, revenue sufficiency, 
rate (price) stability, fairness in apportionment of costs, avoidance of undue rate 
discrimination, and encouragement of efficiency.1 The task of setting water tariffs might 
be relatively easy if these objectives were mutually reinforcing. However, many 
objectives associated with tariff design often conflict with one another. For example, the 
objectives of full cost recovery and affordability are often believed to be contradictory 
and economic efficiency can also be at odds with cost recovery and revenue stability.   
Overall, the empirical literature on the performance of water and sanitation tariffs 
is relatively thin, fragmented, and dominated by studies that examine tariff performance 
in industrialized countries. The two best-developed threads in the literature include 
studies that estimate the price elasticity of demand or examine how well tariffs target 
subsidies to low-income households. The former category of studies estimate the price – 
and sometimes the income – elasticity of demand to derive second-best prices2 to 
improve economic efficiency (e.g., Renzetti 1992b; Garcia-Valinas 2005; Diakite et al. 
2009; Garcia-Valinas et al. 2010; Rinaudo et al. 2012; Reynaud 2016). These studies 
provide insight into customer behavior and offer concrete examples of how prices can be 
set to improve economic efficiency subject to a cost recovery constraint. However, these 
studies have two principal limitations with respect to the design of water and sanitation 
tariffs. First, economic efficiency is only one of several criteria that policy makers may 
consider when setting water tariffs; tariffs that improve economic efficiency may perform 
poorly with respect to other criteria. Second, policy makers typically do not have the 
                                                 
1 See Berg and Tschirhart (1989), Hanemann (1997), and Whittington (2011) for detailed overviews of the 
various objectives of tariff setting. 
2 Examples of second best prices include Ramsey-Boiteux and Feldstein pricing. The basic aim of Ramsey-
Boiteux pricing is to minimize the welfare losses associated with deviations from marginal cost pricing. To 
accomplish this, Ramsey-Boiteux pricing applies the inverse elasticity rule, in which customers who are 
less sensitive to price changes face higher marginal prices than those who are more sensitive to price 
changes. A common critique of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is that it may be regressive if low-income 
customers are less sensitive to price changes than high-income customers. To address this, Feldstein (1972) 
proposed a pricing strategy that effectively weights the Ramsey-Boiteux price by the marginal utility of 
income, which is assumed to be decreasing in income.   
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necessary information (e.g., local estimates of the price elasticity of demand among 
different customer classes) to implement second-best pricing strategies. Policy makers 
could, of course, obtain this information, but it can be expensive to do so and it may not 
be possible to econometrically estimate these parameters in a credible manner.  
The second well-developed thread in the literature examines the extent to which 
IBTs target subsidies to low-income households. Researchers have long questioned the 
extent to which IBTs effectively target subsidies to low-income households in low- and 
middle-income countries (e.g., Whittington 1992). Two decades of research using a range 
of data sources and methods across several countries has largely confirmed that IBTs do 
not effectively target subsidies to low-income households (Whittington et al. 2015; 
Fuente et al. 2016). However, like economic efficiency, subsidy targeting is one of 
several factors policy makers consider when setting water tariffs.  
Overall, it is difficult to distill general insight from studies in the literature on the 
performance of water and sanitation tariffs. These studies often lack a common approach 
to simulating tariff performance, do not employ a common set of indicators of tariff 
performance, and typically simulate a small set of tariff alternatives. Many studies also 
focus on one or two dimensions of tariff performance. While studies in the literature 
provide insight into how a set of tariffs performs with respect to a particular objective, 
they often do not evaluate tariff performance relative to a portfolio of indicators.  
A recent exception to this is Nauges and Whittington (2017), who use 
hypothetical data on residential customer water use to simulate the performance of nine 
alternative tariffs. In particular, they simulate a transition from a uniform price tariff to an 
IBT and examine how different IBT alternatives perform with respect to subsidy 
incidence and economic efficiency at two levels of cost recovery. Consistent with other 
studies in the literature, they find that the tariff alternatives they simulate do not 
effectively target subsidies to low-income customers at low levels of cost recovery and 
that subsidy targeting is worse when the correlation between income and water use is 
high. Additionally, they find that the efficiency losses associated with a shift from a 
uniform price tariff to an IBT are relatively small, particularly when customers respond to 
average, rather than marginal, price.  
This paper seeks to make several contributions to the literature on tariff design. In 
particular, we extend previous work by Whittington et al. (2015) and Fuente et al. (2016) 
by expanding the scope of our analysis beyond subsidy incidence. This paper also 
extends the recent work of Nauges and Whittington (2017) in several ways. First, we 
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simulate tariff performance using a complete set of billing records from a utility in a non-
industrialized country. Thus, in addition to being one of a few studies to examine the 
performance of tariffs in a low or middle-income country context, our simulations 
include both residential and non-residential customers. Second, we examine a broader 
range of indicators of tariff performance than other studies in the literature. In particular, 
we expand the criteria of tariff performance to include both conservation and the trade-
off between improving cost recovery (i.e., the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through 
the tariff) and the welfare effects associated with different tariffs.   
3. Empirical Strategy 
To assess the relative performance of alternative tariff structures in Nairobi, we 
develop a simulation model to forecast changes in customer water use, the utility’s 
revenue, and the cost of providing water and wastewater services. We use this simulation 
model to examine the performance of five tariff alternatives relative to several policy-
relevant criteria at three different levels of cost recovery. The simulation model runs in 
annual time steps over a five-year planning horizon, an interval at which tariff reviews 
are often conducted by regulators and over which a utility might seek to achieve full cost 
recovery. We then measure the performance of alternative tariff structures relative to a 
dynamic baseline – i.e., forecasts of the status quo tariff over the same planning horizon.  
3.1. Description of Tariff Simulation Model 
The total quantity of water used by customers and the total quantity of wastewater 
produced is determined by several factors, including the size of the service population, 
the composition of the service population (i.e., fraction of customers with water service 
only and fraction with both water and wastewater service), the tariff, climatic conditions, 
the wealth and other attributes of the service population, and service substitutes (e.g., 
private wells, water vendors, septic tanks). Our simulation model forecasts customer 
water use as a function of the water use in the prior period, customers’ price elasticity of 
demand, the change in price customers face, customers’ income elasticity of demand, and 
the change in income (Equation 1).  
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ �1 + (𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∗ ∆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑌𝑌 ∗ ∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑅𝑅)� (1) 
where…. 
• WUSEj,t is the average monthly water use for a customer j in year t;  
• WUSEj,t-1 is the average monthly water use for customer j in year t-1;  
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• 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is the price elasticity of demand for customer j in year t; 
• ∆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 is the percent change in price from year t-1 to t-2 for customer j; 
• ɛ Y  is the income elasticity of demand for residential customers;  
• ΔIt is the percent change in income from year t-1 to t; and  
•  𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if customer j is a residential 
customer and 0 otherwise.  
In our base case scenario, we assume that that the income elasticity of demand for 
residential customers is +0.1 and that the annual change in income for residential 
customers is equal to 5%. (See Appendix 1 for a summary of parameter values used in 
our base case simulations.)  
Economic theory assumes that consumers are well informed about the price 
schedules they face and that they respond to marginal prices. However, in the face of 
complex price schedules, consumers may not be well informed about the marginal price 
they face.3 Additional factors that may influence whether customers respond to marginal 
price, average price, or some other price signal (e.g., an increase in the bill, expected 
marginal or average price, etc.) include the salience of customers’ water bills, individual 
customer characteristics, water use, billing frequency, and payment method (e.g., 
automatic withdrawal, payment center, mobile money). Field work conducted for Fuente 
at al. (2016) suggested that customers in Nairobi were not well informed about the tariff 
they faced. Thus, in our base case simulations we assume that customers respond to 
changes in average, rather than marginal, price. 
Because we do not have estimates of the price elasticity of demand for piped 
water services in Nairobi, we use estimates of the price elasticity of demand from the 
                                                 
3 Since the issue was raised by Howe and Linaweaver (1967) and later discussed by Taylor (1975) and 
Nordin (1976), the extent to which customers respond to average or marginal price has been widely 
explored in the applied economics literature, particularly in the context of income tax (e.g., Saez 1999; 
Saez 2003; Saez 2010; Chetty et al. 2011), electricity tariffs (e.g., Ito 2014; Borenstein 2009), and to a 
lesser extent water tariffs (e.g., Foster and Beatie 1981; Ruijs et al. 2008; Nataraj and Hanemann 2011; 
Binet et al. 2013; Ito 2013). To our knowledge, only Binet et al. (2013) have explored whether water utility 
customers respond to average or marginal price in a developing country context; they found that customers’ 
response indicated that customers underestimated both average and marginal price.   
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literature. In our base case, we assume that residential customers who use above 5 m3/mo. 
have a price elasticity of demand of -0.2 (Arbues et al. 2003; Dalhuisen et al. 2003; 
Espey et al. 1997; Nauges and Whittington 2010). We also assume that residential 
customers who use less than 5 m3/mo. are insensitive to price changes.4 Because 
customers are unlikely to immediately adjust their water use in response to changes in 
price, we assume that residential customers respond to a one-year lagged change in price. 
Because we do not have estimates of the price elasticity of demand for piped 
water services in Nairobi, we use estimates of the price elasticity of demand from the 
literature. In our base case, we assume that residential customers who use above 5 m3/mo. 
have a price elasticity of demand of -0.2 (Arbues et al. 2003; Dalhuisen et al. 2003; 
Espey et al. 2007; Nauges and Whittington 2010). We also assume that residential 
customers who use less than 5 m3/mo. are insensitive to price changes.5 Because 
customers are unlikely to immediately adjust their water use in response to changes in 
price, we assume that residential customers respond to a one-year lagged change in price. 
The literature on the demand for water among non-residential customers (e.g., 
commercial, industrial, and bulk customers) is quite thin, but suggests that non-residential 
customers are typically more responsive than residential customers to price changes 
(Renzetti 1992a; Renzetti 1992b; Reynaud 2003; Garcia and Reynaud 2004; Worthington 
2010). However, in our simulations we assume that non-residential customers in Nairobi 
are insensitive to price changes. As discussed in more detail below, we make this 
assumption to allow us to estimate the economic impact of price changes on non-
residential customers. While we believe this assumption is plausible in Nairobi given the 
low prices of water and the relatively short duration of our simulation period, it may 
result in our simulations overestimating the total amount of water used by non-residential 
customers.  
We calculate customers’ average monthly bill as a function of their water use and 
the tariff alternative simulated. The utility’s average monthly revenue is the sum of all 
customers’ bills multiplied by the utility’s collection efficiency – i.e., the percent of total 
billings the utility collects as revenue. The total amount of water the utility must produce 
                                                 
4 This is supported by empirical studies that use a Stone-Geary demand function to estimate what portion of 
water use is insensitive to price control (Madhoo 2009; Martinez-Espineira and Nauges 2004; Nauges et al. 
2009). 
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and the total quantity of wastewater it must treat in each year of the simulation are a 
function of customer water use and the fraction of customers with a wastewater 
connection (Equations 2 and 3). The amount of water the utility must produce in each 
year of the simulation is also a function of the level of non-revenue water,5 which may 
vary over time.   
𝑄𝑄𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡 = � �𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗=1
� (1 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡)�  (2) 
where…  
• Qw,t is the average amount of water that must be produced by the utility in year t;  
• Nt is the total number of customers in year t;  
• WUSEj,t is the average monthly water use for customer j in year t (Equation 1); 
and  
• NRWt is the level of non-revenue water in year t.  
𝑄𝑄𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡 = � �𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗=1
� (3) 
where…  
• Qww,t is the average amount of water that must be treated by the utility in year t;  
• Nt is the total number of customers in year t;  
• WUSEj,t is the average monthly water use for customer j at time t (Equation 1); 
and 
• Iwwj, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if customer j has a wastewater 
connection and 0 if she does not.  
As indicated in Equations 2 and 3, the simulation model accommodates annual 
changes in the size of the customer base (Nt). In our base case, we assume that the 
customer base increases 5% per year and that the relative composition of the customer 
                                                 
5 We define non-revenue water as the volume of water produced by the utility minus the amount of water 
billed to customers, divided by the volume of water produced by the utility. 
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base remains constant throughout the five-year planning period (e.g., the proportion of 
residential and non-residential customers remains constant, as well as the proportion of 
customers who receive wastewater service). 
A water utility needs financial resources to pay for three broad categories of costs: 
routine operations and maintenance costs (O&M costs), the repair and replacement of the 
existing capital stock, and the expansion of the water and wastewater network to meet 
increased demand for these services (expansion costs). Privately owned utilities also need 
revenue to pay dividends or retained profits. We assume that full cost recovery tariffs are 
tariffs that would allow the utility to raise sufficient revenue to cover O&M and capital 
costs without subsidies or without running down the capital stock. Based on our previous 
work, we assume that the full cost of water service and wastewater service in Nairobi is 
0.94 USD/m3 and 0.98 USD/m3, respectively (Fuente et al. 2016). We also assume that 
the utility operates at constant returns to scale.  
3.2. Performance Criteria 
We evaluate the performance of alternative tariffs relative to five criteria: 
aggregate water use (i.e., conservation), the magnitude of the total subsidy delivery 
through the tariff, subsidy incidence, change in customer welfare, and change in social 
welfare (e.g., the deadweight loss to society). We have selected these criteria because 
they represent issues about which various stakeholders (policy makers, utility managers, 
economists, etc.) often express concern.6  
We define aggregate water use under each tariff alternative as the total amount of 
water sold to customers. We compare aggregate water use under each tariff alternative at 
the end of the five-year planning period to a dynamic baseline of forecasts of aggregate 
water use under the current tariff at the end of the five-year planning period at status quo 
levels of cost recovery.  
We define the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the tariff as the 
difference between the utility’s revenue and the cost of providing services. We calculate 
the subsidies delivered through the tariff alternatives each year and report the net present 
value of the stream of subsidies over the five-year simulation period.7 We also examine 
                                                 
6 These are positive indicators of tariff performance and we do not ex-ante assign a normative weighting to 
them. 
7 All net present value calculations use a real discount rate of 10%.  
Environment for Development Fuente et al. 
10 
the distributional incidence of subsidies delivered through the tariff, which we define as 
the share of total subsidies delivered to low-income residential customers (Equation 4).  
𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = ∑ ��𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗�𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗=1 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  (4) 
where: 
• St is the share of subsidies delivered to residential customers in low-income areas 
in year t; 
• SUBt is the average monthly subsidies delivered through the tariff in year t; 
• Nt is the total number of customers at time t;  
• WUSEj,t is the average monthly water use for customer j in year t (Equation 1); 
• COSTj,t is the average cost of serving customer j in year t; 
• BILLj,t is the average monthly bill for residential customer j in year t; and 
• Lj is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if customer j is a low-income 
residential customer and 0 otherwise. 
NCWSC sells water to both residential and non-residential customers. We 
approximate the change in welfare for residential customers by calculating the change in 
consumer surplus that accompanies the transition to a new tariff. In particular, we use 
Equation 5 to calculate the change in consumer surplus for each customer and sum over 
the customer base to obtain the aggregate change in consumer surplus for each period in 
the simulation (Nauges and Whittington 2017). 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 = −� 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�� �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 (1+𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗.𝑡𝑡) − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�1+𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗.𝑡𝑡�� (5) 
where:  
• ∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇  is the change in consumer surplus for residential customer j under tariff 
alternative T in year t;  
• 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is the quantity of water customer j would use under the status quo tariff in 
year t;  
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• Pj,t is the price8 faced by customer j at time t under the status quo tariff in year t;  
• 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is the price elasticity of demand for customer j in year t; and 
• 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇  is the price faced by customer j under tariff alternative T in year t. 
The water use of non-residential customers reflects a producer’s demand for an 
input (Renzetti 1992a; Reynaud 2003). We assume that non-residential customers are 
producers that select their use of inputs, including water, to minimize the cost of 
producing a certain level of output. We do not have information on non-residential 
customers’ use of other inputs or their underlying production functions. Thus, we assume 
that their water demands are separable from other input demands (Renzetti 1992b; Garcia 
and Reynaud 2004)9 and estimate welfare effects of price changes on non-residential 
customers as the change in their profits. Relying on our assumption that non-residential 
customers are insensitive to price changes, we approximate the change in profits for non-
residential customers as the difference between the water bills they face under the status 
quo tariff and the different tariff alternatives we consider.10  
As noted by Renzetti (1992b), a change in the water tariff can affect residential 
customers through two distinct channels. A change in tariff will affect residential 
customers directly through the price they face for water and sanitation services. We 
approximate this effect by the change in consumer surplus as described above. A change 
in tariff may also affect residential customers indirectly via the impact of price changes 
on non-residential customers’ outputs. This effect is not included in our estimates of the 
change in customer welfare.11 
In our base case, we assume that customers respond to changes in average, rather 
than marginal, price. As noted by Nauges and Whittington (2017), if customers respond 
to changes in marginal price, Equation 5 will not accurately measure the change in 
                                                 
8 This is either the average or marginal price facing the customer, depending on whether the model assumes 
that customers respond to changes in average or marginal prices.  
9 We do not have data to confirm whether this assumption holds in Nairobi. However, both Renzetti 
(1992b) and Garcia and Reynaud (2004) cite examples that suggest this assumption may be reasonable in 
some industrialized countries.  
10 We acknowledge that this is a rough approximation of the impact of price changes on non-residential 
customers. However, additional information on the structure of firms’ production functions would be 
required to develop more accurate estimates of the impact of price changes on non-residential customers.  
11 The indirect effect of the change in prices for non-residential customers on residential customers will be 
reflected in our estimates of the change in welfare if the following two conditions hold: 1) households’ 
demand for water are independent of non-residential outputs, and 2) the output markets for non-residential 
customers are perfectly competitive or face linear demand (Renzetti 1992b; Brown and Sibley 1986).   
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consumer surplus under IBTs. Appendix 2 discusses this in more detail and describes 
how we calculate changes in consumer surplus when we assume that customers respond 
to marginal price.  
Finally, we track changes in the deadweight loss to society as a result of the 
transition from the status quo tariff to different tariff alternatives. We calculate the 
change in deadweight loss as the difference between the change in the magnitude of 
subsidies associated with a shift to a new tariff and the change in change in customer 
welfare that accompanies this transition.  
4. Data and Tariff Alternatives 
We simulate the performance of alternative tariffs using the case of the Nairobi 
Water and Sewer Company. According to Kenya’s most recent census, approximately 
25% of Nairobi’s population indicated that their primary drinking water source was a 
piped water connection into their dwelling (KNBS 2009). This is a private piped 
connection connected to indoor plumbing. An additional 50% indicated that their primary 
drinking water source was a piped connection that was not piped into their dwelling, 
suggesting that in 2009 half the population in Nairobi obtained water from a shared 
connection or public tap. Seventeen percent of households indicated that water vendors 
were their primary source for drinking water.   
We populate our simulation model with information on customer water use from a 
complete set of 21 months of NCWSC’s billing records. This includes households in 
Nairobi with a private piped connection to the network, households with a shared 
connection that are served by the utility, and households that obtain water from public 
kiosks. The billing data cover the period from August 2012 to May 2014 and contain 
information on the water use of NCWSC’s approximately 200,000 customer accounts. 
We calculate customers’ average monthly water use over this period from actual meter 
readings in the billing data (see Fuente et al. 2016 for additional detail).  
NCWSC does not have socioeconomic or demographic information about its 
customers. In the absence of household-level data on income or socioeconomic status, we 
use the geographic location of customer accounts as a proxy for socioeconomic status. In 
particular, we use the GIS location of customer accounts to identify which accounts are 
located in low-income areas. We obtain information on the location and extent of low-
income areas in Nairobi from the MajiData project of Kenya’s Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation (MWI) and Water Services Trust Fund. (See Fuente et al. 2016 for more 
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information about these data). Using this approach, we find that approximately 20% of 
the accounts in the billing records are residential customers located in low-income areas.  
We compare the performance of five tariffs relative to the tariff that was in place 
during the period represented by the billing data that we use in our simulations (Table 1). 
This status quo tariff is an IBT with four usage blocks (IBT4): 0-10 m3/mo., 11-30 
m3/mo., 31-60 m3/mo., and greater than 60 m3/mo. The tariff alternatives we simulate 
include an IBT with three usage blocks and a lifeline block of 10 m3/mo. per account 
(IBT3); an IBT with two usage blocks and a lifeline block of 5 m3/mo. per account 
(IBT2-5); an IBT with two usage blocks and a lifeline block of 10 m3/mo. per account 
(IBT2-10); a uniform price tariff (UP); and a uniform price tariff with a fixed charge or 
rebate (UP+R), in which we set the uniform volumetric price equal to the long-run 
marginal cost of service delivery.12 The IBT3 tariff alternative represents the tariff for 
which NCWSC applied in its most recent tariff review. The IBT2-5 and IBT2-10 tariff 
alternatives provide an opportunity to examine how reducing the number of blocks and 
the size of the lifeline block would affect tariff performance. The UP tariff allows us to 
examine how a simple uniform price tariff performs relative to IBTs. The UP+R tariff 
alternative provides an opportunity to examine the performance of a tariff promoted by 
economists to simultaneously promote economic efficiency and cost recovery.  
We simulate the performance of these five tariff alternatives under three cost 
recovery scenarios: status quo cost recovery (31%), an intermediate level of cost recovery 
(65%), and full cost recovery (100%). These cost recovery scenarios reflect cost recovery 
under our base case assumption that NCWSC has 30% non-revenue water and 85% 
collection efficiency, which reflects NCWSC’s current level of operational efficiency.  
In our base case scenario, the tariff alternatives share several common features. 
For example, we assume that the monthly meter rent is constant across all tariff scenarios 
(0.68 USD/mo. at baseline) and that the volumetric price applied to bulk and kiosk 
customers is the same across tariff alternatives for a given level of cost recovery. With 
the exception of the UP+R tariff scenario, we assume that the sewerage surcharge is 75% 
for all tariffs, the same surcharge currently assessed by NCWSC. Under the UP+R tariff 
scenario, we set the volumetric rate for sewer service equal to the long-run marginal cost 
of sewer service. 
                                                 
12 For the purposes of our analysis, we assume that the long-run marginal cost is equal to the average O&M 
and capital costs for water and sewerage service in Nairobi. (See Saunders et al. (1977) for a detailed 
discussion of alternative conceptions of marginal cost pricing for water and sanitation services.) 
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For the status quo level of cost recovery, we set the volumetric prices in each 
tariff to ensure the tariff alternatives reach the same level of cost recovery as the baseline 
tariff (31%). The prices for each tariff in this scenario remain constant throughout the 
five-year planning horizon. For the IBT tariff alternatives, there is an infinite combination 
of volumetric prices in each block that could achieve a particular level of cost recovery. 
We use the following tariff design guidelines to set the tariffs for our base case analysis.  
In each cost recovery scenario, we assume that the price in the lifeline block of the IBT 
tariff alternatives is the same. For example, in the status quo cost recovery scenario 
(31%), we assume that the volumetric price in the lifeline block is 0.22 USD/m3 in all 
IBT tariff alternatives. In the IBT3 tariff scenario, we set the prices in the second and 
third usage blocks so that the volumetric prices in each usage block are proportional to 
the prices in NCWSC’s most recent application for a new tariff. In the IBT2-5 and IBT2-
10 tariff scenarios, we set the price in the upper usage block to meet the target level of 
cost recovery. For the UP tariff, we set the uniform volumetric price to achieve the target 
level of cost recovery given our assumptions about the magnitude of the meter rent and 
sewerage surcharge.  
Finally, under the UP+R tariff, we set the volumetric price for water and sewerage 
service equal to the long-run marginal cost of service delivery and apply a positive fixed 
charge or a rebate to meet the appropriate cost recovery level in each year.13 For example, 
if revenue exceeds the amount necessary to meet a particular level of cost recovery, 
customers receive a rebate. Conversely, when revenue is not sufficient to meet a 
particular level of cost recovery, customers are assessed a positive fixed charge. We 
assume the fixed charge or rebate is applied in a lump sum manner – i.e., the fixed charge 
or rebate allocated to each customer is calculated by dividing the amount needed to 
achieve the target level of cost recovery by the total number of customer accounts. We 
also assume that the fixed charge or rebate does not affect customers’ decisions to 
connect to, or disconnect from, the piped water and sewer network.  
For the intermediate level of cost recovery and full cost recovery scenarios, we 
follow the same tariff-setting guidelines described above, but increase the volumetric 
prices in each tariff alternative by a fixed percent (in real terms) every year to reach the 
                                                 
13 We set the rebate or fixed charge each year to ensure that the UP+R tariff alternative provides the same 
annual level of cost recovery as the UP tariff alternative over the five-year planning period.  
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target level of cost recovery in the final year of the planning horizon.14  Many tariff 
design alternatives can achieve the same level of cost recovery. For example, in our 
intermediate and full cost recovery scenarios we assume that the meter rent is increased 
by the same percentage as the volumetric prices throughout the planning period. 
Alternatively, we could have opted to leave the meter rent at the current level and set the 
required annual price increase to meet the specified level of cost recovery. We also could 
have opted not to increase the volumetric price in the lifeline block over the simulation 
period and increased the prices in the upper blocks to meet the specified cost recovery 
objective. While these are potentially important considerations for tariff design for a 
particular utility, they do not affect the relative performance of the tariff alternatives we 
simulate, which is the primary objective of this paper. 
5. Results 
The NCWSC billing data used in our simulations contain approximately 200,000 
accounts. Residential customers constitute nearly 95% of customer accounts in 
NCWSC’s billing records and account for approximately 60% of water sold (Table 2). 
Although non-residential customers represent a small share (5%) of the total number of 
accounts, they account for 35% of total water use and 40% of total revenue under the 
baseline tariff. Mean water use among residential customers is 31 m3/mo. compared to 
347 m3/mo. among non-residential customers. The high standard deviation in water use 
between residential and non-residential customers suggests there is considerable 
heterogeneity in water use within each customer class.  
Over 70% of customer accounts receive both water and sewer service.  Under the 
baseline tariff, residential customers with only water service pay an average price of 0.57 
USD/m3.  Residential customers with both water and wastewater service pay an average 
of 0.80 USD/m3 for both services, which reflects the 75% surcharge NCWSC assesses for 
wastewater service.  
                                                 
14 There are several potential “paths” to achieve a target level of cost recovery by a specified date. For 
example, a utility could increase prices rapidly in the early years of a planning horizon and less 
dramatically in the later years. Alternatively, they could raise prices slowly in the initial years and increase 
them more dramatically in the latter years of the planning horizon. Both approaches could meet a cost 
recovery target by the end of the specified planning period, but have different implications with respect to 
the temporal allocation of costs and benefits as well as the political economy of the tariff reform process. 
We abstract from this in our simulations and increase prices the same percent each year because it does not 
affect the relative performance of the tariff alternatives we consider.  
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Under the status quo tariff, NCWSC achieves a simulated 31% level of cost 
recovery in Year 5 of the planning period and would sell approximately 12.6 million 
m3/mo. of water per month under our base case assumptions. Under the status quo tariff, 
residential customers in low-income areas receive 13% of the total subsidy delivered 
through the tariff, which is proportional to their share of water use, but less than the share 
of total accounts they represent (20%).  
5.1. Status Quo Cost Recovery (31%) 
Table 3 summarizes the results of our simulation at status quo levels of cost 
recovery under our base case assumptions. The IBT3 and IBT2-10 tariffs result in similar 
levels of water use as the baseline tariff (IBT4). The IBT2-5 and UP tariffs produce a 
small (2%) decrease in total water use relative to the baseline tariff. In contrast to the 
similar levels of total water use simulated under the IBT and UP tariffs, the UP+R tariff 
yields a 19% reduction in water use relative to the baseline tariff. This simulated 
reduction in water use is driven by the fact that the volumetric price for water service 
under the UP+R tariff is four times larger than the volumetric price in the first block of 
the baseline tariff and one and half times larger than the price in the highest block of the 
baseline tariff (Table 4). The magnitude of the simulated reduction in water use under the 
UP+R tariff must be viewed with caution because the elasticities used in the simulation 
model represent customers’ response to small (marginal) changes in price.  
All customers are subsidized at status quo levels of cost recovery. The magnitude 
of the subsidy delivered through the tariff is quite large, approximately 150% of the total 
revenue received by the utility.  The IBT and UP tariff alternatives result in small 
changes in the net present value of subsidies delivered through the tariff over the 
simulation period. This reflects the fact that all the tariff alternatives produce the same 
level of cost recovery by design and that water use is largely unchanged under each of 
these tariff alternatives relative to the baseline tariff. In contrast, the UP+R tariff 
alternative results in 17% reduction in the net present value of the subsidies delivered 
through the tariff, which accompanies the simulated reduction in water use. Under the 
UP+R tariff, customers receive subsidies as a rebate rather than through the volumetric 
prices in the tariff. At the status quo level of cost recovery, customers receive a rebate of 
35 USD/mo. per account.  
The IBT and UP tariff alternatives perform similarly to the baseline tariff with 
respect to subsidy incidence, delivering 12-13% of the total subsidies to residential 
customers in low-income areas. This reflects the low correlation between income and 
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water use in Nairobi (Fuente et al. 2016) as well as the fact that we do not impose 
different behavioral assumptions on low-income customers and other residential 
customers. Only the UP+R shows a marked improvement in subsidy incidence relative to 
the baseline tariff, delivering 20% of the subsidies to customers in low-income areas. 
This improvement in subsidy targeting occurs because all accounts receive the same 
rebate under the UP+R tariff. While the UP+R tariff performs better than the other tariff 
alternatives with respect to subsidy incidence, subsidies remain poorly targeted because 
nearly 80% of the subsidies do not reach the intended beneficiaries. This finding is 
consistent with other research showing that a water tariff is an ineffective means of 
delivering subsidies to low-income customers (Komives et al. 2005; Whittington et al. 
2015; Fuente et al. 2016; Nauges and Whittington 2017).  
Prices are far below the long-run marginal cost of service delivery at the status 
quo level of cost recovery. At such low prices, customers enjoy considerable welfare 
gains relative to efficient pricing. Under the baseline tariff, we estimate that the consumer 
surplus for residential customers relative to efficient prices is approximately 4.7 million 
USD/mo. in Year 5 of the simulation.15 Overall, each tariff alternative produces a small 
increase in the net present value in customer welfare at status quo levels of cost recovery 
relative to the baseline tariff. The UP tariff alternative results in a slightly larger increase 
in customer welfare than the IBT tariff alternatives, which reflects the decrease in the 
average price facing high-volume customers under this tariff.  
Customers experience the largest simulated gains (6%) under the UP+R tariff. 
Though customers experience a reduction in welfare associated with reduced water use, 
they receive a rebate from the utility under the UP+R tariff. At status quo levels of cost 
recovery, the net present value of the rebate over the simulation period is larger than the 
net present value of the decreases in welfare associated with the UP+R tariff. 
                                                 
15 The average surplus received by residential customers is 20 USD/mo. account. This may appear large, 
particularly in the context of Nairobi. However, there are several factors that must be considered when 
interpreting the magnitude of these surplus gains. First, we measure consumer surplus from a hypothetical 
baseline of long-run marginal cost pricing in which the volumetric price is much higher than the price 
facing customers at status quo levels of cost recovery. The elasticities used in our welfare calculations 
describe customer response to small price changes and may not accurately describe consumer response to 
large price changes. Second, the magnitude of the consumer surplus enjoyed by customers relative to 
efficient prices at status quo cost recovery is much lower than the subsidy delivered through the tariff (~75 
USD/mo. per account). Finally, 20 USD/mo. per account may appear large compared to perceptions of 
household incomes in Nairobi. However, we estimate the surplus for a household with a private connection 
consuming 15 m3/mo. facing the status quo tariff to be approximately 5.76 USD/mo. This is larger than 
their bill (5.16 USD/mo.), but smaller than the subsidy associated their water use (~9 USD/mo.). It is also 
important to recall that only the relatively well-off have private piped connections in Nairobi. 
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All of the tariff alternatives result in net losses to society at status quo levels of 
cost recovery because the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the tariff is larger 
than the welfare gain customers experience from the low volumetric prices at this level of 
cost recovery. Table 3 shows the change in deadweight loss associated with the shift from 
the baseline tariff to each of the tariff alternatives at status quo levels of cost recovery. 
Though all of the tariff alternatives produce some reduction in the deadweight loss to 
society, the IBT3 tariff results in the smallest reduction in the deadweight loss to society. 
The IBT2-5 and UP tariffs produce similar reductions in the deadweight loss to society, 
which reflects the fact that the magnitude of the subsidy remains unchanged while 
customers experience small increases in welfare under these tariffs. The UP+R tariff 
produces the largest reduction (35%) in the net present value of losses over the simulation 
period relative to efficient pricing, which reflects the simulated decrease in subsidies 
under the UP+R tariff and the fact that customers experience slightly larger increases in 
welfare compared to the other tariff alternatives.  
5.2. Intermediate Cost Recovery (65%) 
At status quo levels of cost recovery, customers experience considerable welfare 
gains relative to efficient pricing. However, this results in a large deadweight loss to 
society, highlighting potential gains that can be achieved by improving cost recovery. To 
achieve our intermediate level of cost recovery (65%) by the end of the five-year 
simulation period, prices must be increased 16% annually in real terms (Table 4). This 
results in prices in the IBT and UP tariffs more than doubling over the five-year 
simulation period. For example, the price in the lifeline block of the IBT tariffs increases 
from 0.22 USD/m3 to 0.47 USD/m3 in Year 5. Similarly, the volumetric price in the UP 
tariff increases from 0.47 USD/m3 to 0.99 USD/m3, slightly more than our estimates of 
the long-run marginal cost of water supply in Nairobi. Though the volumetric price in the 
UP+R tariff does not change, the rebate customers receive under this tariff decreases 
from 35 USD/mo. per account to 4 USD/mo. per account.  
At 65% cost recovery, the performance of the tariff alternatives relative to one 
another is similar to what we observe at status quo levels of cost recovery (Table 5). For 
example, as prices increase to improve cost recovery, the IBT and UP tariff alternatives 
produce similar decreases in the overall water use (8-10%) relative to the baseline tariff. 
The UP+R tariff produces the same simulated reduction (19%) in water use as the status 
quo level of cost recovery because the volumetric price does not change under the UP+R 
tariff. 
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The increase in prices necessary to meet the intermediate level cost recovery, and 
the simulated decrease in water use that accompanies this increase, result in a reduction 
in customer welfare relative to the baseline tariff. The net present value of the change in 
customer welfare over the simulation period ranges from approximately -11 million 
USD/mo. (UP+R) to -13.5 million USD/mo. (IBT3). This corresponds to a 39% (UP+R) 
to 48% (IBT3) decrease in the welfare gains customers experience under the baseline 
tariff relative to efficient prices. As we observe at status quo levels of cost recovery, in 
the aggregate customers experience smaller reductions in welfare under the UP tariff than 
the IBT tariff alternatives.  
Relative to the low prices they face at status quo levels of cost recovery, 
customers are worse off when the utility increases prices to reach the intermediate level 
of cost recovery. However, this increase in prices results in a decrease in the magnitude 
of the subsidies delivered through the tariff and all of the tariff alternatives result in 
simulated reductions in the deadweight loss to society. The reduction in simulated losses 
ranges from -4.5 million USD/mo. under IBT3 to -12.6 million USD/mo. under UP+R. 
The UP and IBT2-5 tariffs result in a slightly larger reduction in the deadweight loss to 
society than the IBT2-10 and IBT3 tariff alternatives.  This reflects the fact that the IBT 
and UP tariff alternatives produce the same reduction in subsidies delivered through the 
tariff, while the UP and IBT2-5 tariffs result in smaller decreases in customer welfare. 
5.3. Full Cost Recovery 
Substantial subsidies are still delivered through the tariff at intermediate levels of 
cost recovery. To reach full cost recovery by the end of the simulation period, the utility 
would need to increase prices 27% annually (Table 4). Under these price increases, the 
price in the lifeline block of the IBT tariff alternatives would increase from 0.22 USD/m3 
to 0.72 USD/m3. Similarly, the volumetric price in the UP tariff increases from 0.47 
USD/m3 to 1.51 USD/m3, well above our estimate of the long-run marginal cost of water 
supply in Nairobi. At the status quo and intermediate levels of cost recovery, customers 
receive a rebate under the UP+R tariff. However, to reach full cost recovery, customers 
must be assessed a fixed charge of 26.50 USD/mo. per account.  
As shown in Table 6, we observe a similar pattern in the relative performance of 
the tariff alternatives as in the status quo and intermediate levels of cost recovery. In 
particular, the IBT and UP tariff alternatives perform similarly to one another and the 
UP+R tariff appears to outperform the other tariff alternatives across all of the criteria we 
consider.  
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Although the tariff alternatives exhibit similar relative performance as in the 
status quo and intermediate levels of cost recovery, the full cost recovery scenario 
provides insight into the implications of the utility moving toward financial self-
sufficiency. At full cost recovery, the IBT and UP tariff alternatives result in a 13 to 19% 
reduction in aggregate water use in Year 5 of the simulation period, relative to the status 
quo tariff. As we caution above in the context of the UP+R tariff, however, the price 
increases required to achieve full cost recovery are quite large and the magnitude of these 
simulated reductions in water use must be interpreted with caution.  
Customers continue to receive subsidies as the utility increases prices annually to 
reach full cost recovery in the final year of the simulation. However, all of the tariff 
alternatives result in a 50% or larger reduction in the net present value of the subsidies 
delivered through the tariff over the simulation period.  This decrease in the net present 
value of subsidies, and the price increases required to achieve full cost recovery, are 
accompanied by substantial reductions in customer welfare (Table 6) across all tariff 
alternatives.  
5.4. Trade-Offs along the Path to Cost Recovery 
Thus far we have focused primarily on the relative performance of the tariff 
alternatives at the three levels of cost recovery, yet there are tradeoffs along the path to 
recovery that warrant additional attention. Figure 1 highlights the dynamics of the trade-
off between customer welfare, the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the tariff, 
and deadweight loss as the utility transitions from status quo levels of cost recovery to 
full cost recovery under the UP tariff.16 At the beginning of the simulation period, the 
utility is at status quo levels of cost recovery. At such low prices, customers experience 
considerable welfare gains relative to efficient pricing, but a large amount of subsidies 
are delivered through the tariff. Because the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through 
the tariff is larger than the gains in customer welfare, the status quo level of cost recovery 
results in a deadweight loss to society.  
As the utility increases prices to improve cost recovery, the magnitude of the 
subsidy delivered through the tariff decreases and customers experience a decrease in 
welfare relative to status quo levels of cost recovery. This results in a decrease in the 
deadweight loss to society as the utility moves along the path to full cost recovery.  
                                                 
16 The deadweight loss and customer welfare in Figure 1 start from baseline welfare and deadweight loss 
under the status quo tariff relative to efficient prices.   
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At approximately 70% cost recovery, customers face efficient prices (i.e., the 
long-run marginal cost) and thus do not experience welfare gains relative to efficient 
prices. However, the utility does not achieve full cost recovery when customers face 
efficient prices because it operates at 30% non-revenue water. When customers face 
efficient prices, the deadweight loss to society is equal to the magnitude of the subsidy 
delivered through the tariff.  
To reach full cost recovery, the utility must increase prices above efficient prices. 
While this reduces and eventually eliminates the subsidy delivered through the tariff, it 
results in customers experiencing a decrease in welfare relative to efficient prices. Thus, 
at full cost recovery there is still a deadweight loss to society, which equals the decrease 
in welfare customers experience relative to efficient prices. It is interesting to note that, at 
approximately 80% cost recovery, deadweight loss to society is comprised equally of the 
subsidy delivered through the tariff and the losses customers experience due to inefficient 
pricing. 
6. Model Extensions and Additional Considerations  
There are several ways to extend our analysis and issues that warrant further 
consideration. In this section, we examine the relative performance of the tariff 
alternatives when customers respond to marginal, rather than average, price, and we 
discuss several issues associated with the implementation of a UP+R tariff in practice. 
We also highlight the limitations of our analysis and identify areas for additional 
research.   
6.1. What Happens When Customers Respond to Marginal Price? 
In our base case simulations, we assume that customers respond to average rather 
than marginal price. Thus, it is not surprising that the IBT and UP tariff alternatives 
perform similarly to one another when customers respond to average price. We think it is 
reasonable to assume that customers in Nairobi respond to average price because water 
prices are currently very low in Nairobi and customers face a complicated IBT. However, 
it is plausible that customers might respond to marginal price under a less complicated 
tariff (e.g., an IBT with fewer blocks or a uniform price tariff) or as prices increase and 
become more salient. Thus, in this section we present the results of our simulations 
assuming that customers respond to marginal price.  
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Our simulations indicate that the prices required to reach the three levels of cost 
recovery are similar irrespective of whether customers respond to average or marginal 
price (Appendix 3). For example, prices must be increased 16% and 27% annually to 
reach intermediate and full cost recovery, respectively, when customers respond to 
marginal price. This is the same as the price increases required to reach these levels of 
cost recovery when customers respond to average price.  
In general, all of the tariff alternatives result in smaller simulated reductions in 
water use than when customers respond to average price (Table 7). For example, the 
UP+R tariff produces a 13% simulated reduction in water use, compared to 19% when 
customers respond to average price. These smaller reductions in water use are 
accompanied by smaller decreases in customer welfare as the utility increases prices to 
improve cost recovery, particularly for the IBT tariffs. Finally, with the exception of the 
UP+R tariff, all tariff alternatives produce larger reductions in the deadweight loss to 
society when customer respond to marginal price.  
Whether customers respond to average or marginal price affects the magnitude of 
the outcomes we simulate. This has implications for infrastructure planning as well as the 
magnitude of the welfare effects associated in the transition to new tariff structures and 
improved levels of cost recovery. However, the extent to which customers respond to 
average or marginal price also has implications for the performance of the tariff 
alternatives relative to one another.  
When customers respond to average price, our simulations indicate that the UP 
tariff alternatives (UP and UP+R) perform equally as well as, or better than, the IBT tariff 
alternatives across all of the criteria we consider. When customers respond to marginal 
price, however, the UP performs similarly to the IBT tariffs, but no longer dominates the 
IBT tariff alternatives (Table 7). For example, at intermediate and full cost recovery, the 
UP tariff produces reductions in total water use that are similar to the IBT tariff 
alternatives. However, the UP tariff produces slightly larger reductions in customer 
welfare than either the IBT2-5 or IBT2-10 tariff. As a result, the UP tariff also leads to 
smaller deadweight loss reductions than the IBT2 tariff.  
Finally, we observe a narrowing of the performance gap between the UP+R tariffs 
and other tariff alternatives when customers respond to marginal price. For example, in 
our base case simulations, there is a five to six percentage point difference in the 
reduction in water use between the UP+R and other tariff alternatives at full cost 
recovery. When customers respond to marginal price, this gap narrows to one to two 
Environment for Development Fuente et al. 
23 
percentage points. Unlike in our base case simulations, we find that the UP+R tariff 
produces similar reductions in welfare as the IBT2 tariff alternatives, as prices increase to 
reach full cost recovery. 
6.2. Reconsidering the Uniform Price with Rebate (UP+R) Tariff 
Economists have long recommended the UP+R tariff on the grounds of promoting 
economic efficiency (Coase 1946; Saunders et al. 1977). Our simulations show that the 
UP+R outperforms the IBT and UP tariff alternatives with respect to not only economic 
efficiency, but also equity (i.e., subsidy incidence), the welfare effects on customers, and 
conservation at all levels of cost recovery. This finding holds regardless of whether 
customers respond to average or marginal price. These results could be interpreted as 
providing a convincing case that the UP+R tariff should be implemented more widely in 
the sector. However, we caution against that interpretation for several reasons discussed 
below.  
First, utilities may find the UP+R tariff administratively or politically difficult to 
implement. In weak institutional contexts, or where the public has a low level of 
confidence in public institutions, it may not be politically feasible or advisable for 
utilities to collect revenues that would later be returned to customers in the form of a 
rebate. The implementation of the UP+R tariff also requires a credible and politically 
acceptable means of calculating the magnitude of the fixed charge (or rebate) required to 
meet the utility’s target level of cost recovery. This raises practical questions about how a 
utility might implement a UP+R tariff.  
For example, should the fixed charge or rebate be determined ex ante based on 
forecasts of customer water use and input costs or ex post once customer water and input 
costs have been observed? If the utility (or regulator) determines the fixed charge ex ante, 
they risk under or overestimating the magnitude of the fixed charge (or rebate) to reach a 
particular level of cost recovery. However, the utility may have limited incentive to 
contain costs if the fixed charge (or rebate) is determined ex post.  
Additionally, our simulations indicate that the magnitude of the fixed charge or 
rebate under UP+R pricing can be quite large. This can occur when the utility operates at 
low levels of cost recovery, when it exhibits a high level of non-revenue water, or when 
the marginal cost is substantially different than the average cost. The efficiency-
promoting properties of the UP+R tariff require the rebate or fixed charge to be applied in 
a lump sum manner. This means that the utility would need to administer the rebate in a 
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manner that did not affect customers’ decisions about how much water to use or their 
decision about whether to connect or disconnect from the network. This raises important 
questions about both how and when the fixed charge is assessed or the rebate is delivered.  
It is possible that the rebate or fixed charge would be less likely to influence 
customers’ monthly water use if it were applied on an annual basis. However, this may 
not be politically acceptable or desirable for the reasons discussed above. Additionally, if 
the fixed charge or rebate were applied on an annual basis, should it be applied at the 
beginning, middle, or end of the fiscal year? The decision about when to apply the fixed 
charge or rebate may have implications for how customers respond to it.   
There may also be behavioral implications related to how the fixed charge or 
rebate is implemented. For example, a rebate could be applied as credit on customers’ 
utility bills, as a one-time cash transfer (e.g., an annual payment), or as a credit against 
income or property tax (e.g., if the utility was run by a municipality). It seems plausible 
that customers would respond differently to each of these modes of rebate delivery and 
that there may be considerable heterogeneity in customer responses associated with the 
timing and mode of delivery of the fixed charge or rebate.   
The magnitude of the fixed charge or rebate under the UP+R tariff may impact 
customers’ decisions about whether to connect or disconnect from the network. This may 
be not be a serious concern in industrialized countries where incomes are relatively high 
and self-supply options are often limited. However, entry-exit issues may be important in 
low- and middle-income countries where groundwater use is often poorly regulated (or 
unregulated), the market for vendors (e.g., tanker trucks) is better developed, and many 
households have already invested in above and below ground storage. The extent to 
which the magnitude of a fixed charge or rebate might affect customers’ entry-exit 
decisions is an empirical question that must be considered to fully characterize the 
economic and financial implications of implementing a UP+R tariff.  
Finally, in a low- or middle-income country context, the magnitude of the fixed 
charge or rebate may be economically salient for some customers. If a rebate or fixed 
charge is a non-negligible fraction of a customer’s income, it may affect her water use via 
an income effect. We do not have information on customers’ income and therefore do not 
address this in our simulations. However, the extent to which a fixed charge or rebate 
influences customer water use may have implications for the performance of the UP+R 
tariff relative to other tariff alternatives.  
Environment for Development Fuente et al. 
25 
6.3. Limitations and Opportunities for Additional Research 
While our results have several implications for the pricing of water and sanitation 
services in low- and middle-income countries, there are caveats that warrant mention, as 
well as areas for future work.  
First, our simulations used water use data from a particular location in a particular 
point in time. While we believe conditions in Nairobi reflect conditions in many large, 
fast-growing cities in low- and middle-income countries, tariff design requires careful 
consideration of, and attention to, local conditions.  
Second, we simulated an illustrative set of tariffs to examine the relative 
performance of alternative tariff structures. Given the central aim of this paper, we hold 
several factors constant across the tariff alternatives, including the magnitude of the 
meter rent, the price in the lifeline block for block tariffs, the sewerage surcharge, and 
pricing for kiosks and bulk customers. There is clearly scope for additional work to 
examine how each of these factors affects tariff performance.  
Third, we constructed a set of tariffs to compare the performance of alternative 
tariff structures. These tariff alternatives were not designed to optimize a particular 
objective or set of objectives. Tariff design using multi-objective optimization techniques 
represents another clear area of expansion for this work.  
Fourth, customers face large price increases under both the UP+R tariff and our 
full cost recovery scenario. The elasticities we use in our simulation represent customers’ 
response to small changes in price and there is considerable uncertainty about how 
customers would respond to such large price increases. While this would not affect the 
relative performance of the tariffs we simulate, how customers respond to large price 
increases may have important implications for infrastructure planning and is an area for 
future research.  
Fifth, our simulations assume that non-residential customers are insensitive to 
price changes. This assumption may be valid at low prices, but may not hold if prices are 
increased dramatically. Additional information on the extent to which price changes 
affect non-residential customers’ water use, production, and profits would be necessary to 
more accurately estimate the impact of price changes on non-residential customers. The 
literature on the demand for municipal water and sanitation services among non-
residential customers is quite thin (Worthington 2010) and represents a clear area for 
future research.  
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Finally, we examined the performance of alternative tariff structures relative to a 
modest set of performance criteria. There are several objectives that policy makers must 
balance when setting water and sanitation tariffs and careful attention must be paid to the 
political economy of tariff reform, including local perceptions of fairness and equity, the 
capacity of utilities to implement complex tariffs, and the incentives that tariffs create for 
both utilities and customers.  
7. Summary and Conclusions 
Our simulations provide several insights with respect to the performance of 
alternative tariff structures in Nairobi and for the design and evaluation of water and 
sanitation tariffs in low- and middle-income countries more broadly. Our findings suggest 
that the IBT tariff alternatives perform similarly to one another with respect to the 
portfolio of criteria we consider. This echoes the findings of Nauges and Whittington 
(2017) and suggests that policy makers and tariff consultants may be misdirecting their 
efforts when they focus on determining the appropriate size of the lifeline block, the 
number of blocks in an IBT, and the relative prices between blocks.  
Additionally, economists have long recommended the UP+R tariff on the grounds 
of promoting economic efficiency (Coase 1946; Saunders et al. 1977). Our simulations 
indicate that the UP+R outperforms the IBT and UP tariff alternatives with respect to not 
only economic efficiency, but also equity (i.e., subsidy incidence) and several other 
policy-relevant indicators of tariff performance. These findings are robust to assumptions 
about whether customers respond to average or marginal price. Some utilities may find 
the UP+R tariff administratively or politically difficult to implement and there are several 
issues associated with how a utility might implement this tariff and, in turn, how this 
might affect customers’ response to a UP+R tariff in practice. Nevertheless, our 
simulations raise interesting questions about how customers might respond to large price 
increases, the extent to which a large fixed charge (or rebate) impacts customers’ entry-
exit decisions, and whether the timing and mechanism for administering the fixed charge 
(or rebate) affects customer behavior. While these questions must be answered to 
determine whether a UP+R tariff can outperform other tariffs in a given context, our 
simulations suggest a UP+R tariff may warrant further consideration. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we also find that a simple tariff with a uniform 
volumetric price (i.e., the UP tariff) performs equally well, or better, compared to the IBT 
tariff alternatives across all of the criteria we consider. While a UP tariff does not have 
the efficiency-promoting properties of a UP+R tariff, a UP tariff is easier to explain to 
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customers and sends a clearer signal than IBTs about the cost of delivering water and 
sanitation services. Thus, our findings suggest that a tariff with a uniform volumetric 
price may perform as well as or better than the IBTs that many utilities are implementing 
in low- and middle-income countries. This finding stands in stark contrast to current 
perceptions of best practice in tariff design among utility managers, regulators, and the 
consultants who provide tariff-setting advice.  
Utilities in low- and middle-income countries often implement tariffs that are not 
sufficient to cover the cost of providing water and sanitation services. Our findings 
reinforce the benefits of getting utilities on the path to full cost recovery. Improving cost 
recovery can promote more efficient water use, improve the financial viability of utilities, 
and deliver net social benefits. At low levels of cost recovery, existing customers of the 
utility experience relatively large welfare gains relative to efficient pricing. However, this 
comes at the expense of the utility and taxpayers (who may also be customers) with 
resulting net losses to society. Low levels of cost recovery also lead to well-documented 
deteriorating levels of service quality and hinder governments’ ability to extend services 
to households that lack access to the piped water and sanitation network.  
Overall, our findings add to a growing body of literature that questions the 
widespread use of IBTs in low- and middle-income countries. However, with the 
exception of the UP+R tariff, we find that there is surprisingly little difference in the 
performance of the tariff alternatives we simulate at a given level of cost recovery. This is 
particularly true when we consider uncertainty about customer behavior. Taken together, 
our findings suggest that when tariffs are not sufficient to cover the cost of water and 
sanitation service delivery, utilities and governments have more to gain by improving 
cost recovery than focusing narrowly on the structure of the tariff used to charge 
customers for water and sanitation services.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Summary of the Tariff Alternatives 
 
Tariff 
Alternative Tariff Type 
No. 
Blocks 
Lifeline Block 
(m3/ac./mo.) 
IBT4 (baseline) IBT 4 10 
IBT3 IBT 3 6 
IBT2-5 IBT 2 5 
IBT2-10 IBT 2 10 
UP Uniform price n.a. n.a. 
UP+R Uniform price w/ rebate n.a. n.a. 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics from the NCWSC Customer Base  
 
  Unit Residential 
Non-
residential Kiosk Bulk 
Water Use      
% total % 57% 35% 3% 4% 
Mean (s.d.) m3/mo. 31 347 192 11,301 
  (194) (1,927) (942) (47,609) 
Accounts % 94% 5% 1% <1% 
Total Revenue % 56% 41% 1% 2% 
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Table 3. Summary of Status Quo Cost Recovery Simulation Results 
 
    Status Quo Cost Recovery (31%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,586,418 12,546,144 12,463,506 12,361,515 12,372,133 10,184,194 
% change %  n.a.  0% -1% -2% -2% -19% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,176,442 -64,259,346 -63,928,548 -63,002,367 -63,286,002 -53,372,468 
% change %  n.a.  0% 0% -2% -1% -17% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% 13% 13% 12% 12% 20% 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  660,356 937,804 789,208 1,047,355 1,829,944 
% status quob %  n.a.  2% 3% 3% 4% 6% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -577,452 -1,185,698 -1,963,283 -1,937,795 -12,633,918 
% status quob % n.a. -2% -3% -5% -5% -35% 
a All NPV calculations use a 10% discount rate.  
b Percent change measured relative to customer welfare and deadweight loss under the status quo tariff relative to efficient prices.  
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Table 4. Summary of Tariff Alternatives Simulated under Base Case Conditions (t=5) 
 
    Cost Recovery Scenario 
    31% 65% 100% 
Common Components   t=5 t=5 t=5 
Meter rent USD/mo. 0.68 1.44 2.22 
Sewer surcharge* % 75% 75% 75% 
Annual price increase % 0% 16% 27% 
4-Block IBT (IBT4 - status quo)         
0 to 10 USD/m3 0.22 0.22 0.22 
11 to 30 USD/m3 0.45 0.45 0.45 
31 to 60 USD/m3 0.50 0.50 0.50 
> 60  USD/m3 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.30 0.30 
3-block IBT (IBT3)         
Block 1 UB m3/mo. 6 6 6 
Block 2 UB m3/mo. 60 60 60 
P Block 1 USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
P Block 2 USD/m3 0.37 0.78 1.21 
P Block 3 USD/m3 0.59 1.26 1.94 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.64 0.98 
2-Block IBT: 10 m3/mo. block 1 (IBT2-10)         
Size of LLB m3/mo. 10 10 10 
Price in LLB USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
Price in UB USD/m3 0.52 1.10 1.70 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.64 0.98 
2-Block IBT: 5 m3/mo. block 1 (IBT2-5)         
Size of LLB m3/mo. 5 5 5 
Price in LLB USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
Price in UB USD/m3 0.51 1.07 1.65 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.64 0.98 
Uniform Price (UP)         
Volumetric price USD/m3 0.47 0.99 1.51 
Uniform Price w/ Rebate (UP+R)         
Vol. price (water only) USD/m3 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Vol. price (water + wastewater) USD/m3 1.93 1.93 1.93 
Vol price (wastewater only) USD/m3 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Rebate (+)/Fixed Chard (-) USD/ac/mo. 35 4 -26.50 
* Except the UP+R tariff 
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Table 5. Summary of Intermediate Cost Recovery Simulation Results 
 
    Intermediate Cost Recovery (65%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,586,418 11,551,921 11,474,577 11,378,184 11,384,305 10,184,194 
% change %  n.a.  -8% -9% -10% -10% -19% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,176,442 -46,121,476 -45,734,727 -45,147,390 -45,435,421 -40,451,553 
% change %  n.a.  -28% -29% -30% -29% -37% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% 14% 12% 12% 12% 20% 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -13,532,599 -13,200,968 -13,031,142 -12,733,580 -11,090,970 
% status quob %  n.a.  -48% -47% -46% -45% -39% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -4,522,366 -5,240,747 -5,997,910 -6,007,441 -12,633,918 
% status quob % n.a. -13% -15% -17% -17% -35% 
a All NPV calculations use a 10% discount rate.  
b Percent change measured relative to customer welfare and deadweight loss under the status quo tariff relative to efficient prices. 
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Table 6. Summary of Full Cost Recovery Simulation Results 
 
    Full Cost Recovery (100%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,586,418 10,954,546 10,885,809 10,789,277 10,799,428 10,184,194 
% change %  n.a.  -13% -14% -14% -14% -19% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,176,442 -31,845,107 -31,437,491 -30,962,315 -31,442,092 -28,531,027 
% change %  n.a.  -50% -51% -52% -51% -56% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -25,521,990 -25,141,093 -24,857,603 -24,371,607 -23,011,497 
% status quob %  n.a.  -90% -89% -88% -86% -81% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -6,809,345 -7,597,858 -8,356,524 -8,362,742 -12,633,918 
% status quob % n.a. -19% -21% -23% -23% -35% 
a All NPV calculations use a 10% discount rate.  
b Percent change measured relative to customer welfare and deadweight loss under the status quo tariff relative to efficient prices. 
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Table 7. Summary of Simulation Results When Customers Respond to Marginal Price 
    Status Quo Cost Recovery (31%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,571,600 12,698,432 12,679,173 12,619,545 12,752,211 10,884,020 
% change %  n.a.  1% 1% 0% 1% -13% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,079,718 -64,978,987 -64,897,409 -64,446,098 -65,506,362 -56,694,684 
% change %  n.a.  1% 1% 1% 2% -12% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 20% 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  1,697,188 2,506,501 2,023,042 1,724,366 3,504,766 
% status quob %  n.a.  6% 9% 7% 6% 12% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -797,919 -1,688,810 -1,656,663 -297,722 -10,889,800 
% status quob % n.a. -2% -5% -5% -1% -31% 
        
    Intermediate Cost Recovery (65%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,571,600 11,718,436 11,702,025 11,653,294 11,775,603 10,884,020 
% change %  n.a.  -7% -7% -7% -6% -13% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,079,718 -46,550,568 -46,387,038 -46,374,551 -46,995,136 -43,070,624 
% change %  n.a.  -27% -28% -28% -27% -33% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% 14% 12% 12% 12% 20% 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -11,959,821 -10,621,233 -10,901,058 -11,987,101 -10,115,411 
% status quob %  n.a.  -42% -37% -38% -42% -36% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -5,569,328 -7,071,448 -6,804,109 -5,097,481 -10,893,684 
% status quob % n.a. -16% -20% -19% -14% -31% 
a All NPV calculations use a 10% discount rate.  
b Percent change measured relative to customer welfare and deadweight loss under the status quo tariff relative to efficient prices. 
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Table 7 (cont.’d). Summary of Simulation Results When Customers Respond to Marginal Price 
 
    Full Cost Recovery (100%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,571,600 11,144,977 11,111,075 11,072,336 11,197,165 10,884,020 
% change %  n.a.  -11% -12% -12% -11% -13% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,079,718 -31,997,088 -32,216,801 -31,874,950 -32,311,800 -29,953,075 
% change %  n.a.  -50% -50% -50% -50% -53% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -23,455,021 -21,304,146 -21,861,420 -23,585,104 -23,230,451 
% status quob %  n.a.  -83% -75% -77% -83% -82% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -8,627,609 -10,558,772 -10,343,348 -8,182,814 -10,896,193 
% status quob % n.a. -24% -30% -29% -23% -31% 
a All NPV calculations use a 10% discount rate.  
b Percent change measured relative to customer welfare and deadweight loss under the status quo tariff relative to efficient prices. 
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Figure 1. Dynamics of the Subsidy, Customer Welfare, Deadweight Loss, and Cost 
Recovery for the UP Tariff Alternative 
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Appendix 1. Simulation Model Parameters for the Base Case Scenario 
 
Model Parameter Unit Model  
EXOGENOUS FACTORS     
Customer growth % 5% 
Economic growth % 5% 
Exchange rate KSH/USD 90 
Discount rate  % 10% 
CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR     
Average vs. marginal price n.a. Average price 
Residential IED n.a. 0.1 
Residential PED   
Usage threshold m3/mo. 5 
Upper PED n.a. -0.2 
Lower PED n.a. 0 
Non-residential PED n.a. 0 
OPERATIONAL 
EFFICIENCY     
NRW % 30% 
Collection efficiency % 85% 
COST     
Operations & 
Maintenance   
Water USD/m3 0.23 
Wastewater USD/m3 0.23 
Capital Costs   
Water USD/m3 0.71 
Wastewater USD/m3 0.75 
     PED = Price elasticity of demand 
      IED = Income elasticity of demand 
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Appendix 2. Calculation of Consumer Surplus under Increasing Block Tariffs 
when Customers Respond to Marginal Price 
As indicated in the main text, Equation 3.5 will not correctly measure the change in 
consumer surplus for increasing block tariffs when customers respond to marginal rather than 
average price. To address this, we measure the change in consumer surplus under each tariff 
alternative in a two-step process. In the first step, we calculate the change in consumer surplus 
under each tariff alternative, relative to a hypothetical baseline in which customers face efficient 
prices, which we assume is the long-run marginal cost of service delivery. In the second step, we 
calculate the change in consumer surplus associated with moving from the baseline tariff to a 
new tariff as the difference in consumer surplus that customers enjoy under the baseline tariff 
and the new tariff, relative to efficient prices. We describe this two-step process in more detail 
below.  
 
Step 1: Adjust estimates of consumer surplus to reflect surplus gained under increasing 
block tariffs.  
Figure A2-1 depicts a scenario in which a customer’s water use falls in the second block 
of a two block IBT with a 10 m3/mo. lifeline block (IBT2-10). When customers respond to 
marginal price, Equation 3.5 measures the area A+B as the change in consumer surplus relative 
to efficient pricing. However, the customer also receives area D under IBT2-10. To address this 
in our calculations of consumer surplus, we add area D to the consumer surplus calculated in 
Equation 3.5. Figure A2-2 depicts a scenario in which a customer’s water use falls in the first 
block of IBT2-10. When customers respond to marginal price, Equation 3.5 measures the area 
H+I as the gain in consumer surplus under IBT2-10 relative to efficient pricing. In this instance, 
Equation 3.5 measures the correct change in consumer surplus and no adjustment is required. 
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Figure A2-1. Customer Water Use in Block 2 of IBT2-10 Relative to Efficient Pricing 
 
 
Figure A2-2. Customer Water Use in Block 1 of IBT2-10 Relative to Efficient Pricing 
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When customers respond to marginal price, we adjust the consumer surplus measured in 
Equation 3.5 to reflect the change in surplus associated with the usage blocks of the IBT tariff 
alternatives. The procedure we use to do this for the IBT2-10 tariff alternative is described in 
Equation A1 below.  
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2−10 = �∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2−10                                                           𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖max�𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡∗ ,𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2−10� < 𝐵𝐵1∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2−10 + �𝑃𝑃2,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2−10 − 𝑃𝑃1,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2−10� ∙ 𝐵𝐵1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖max�𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡∗ ,𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2−10� > 𝐵𝐵1  (A1) 
where,  
• ∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2−10 is the change in consumer surplus for customer j in year t under IBT2-10 
when customer j responds to marginal price;  
• ∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2−10 is the change in consumer surplus for customer j in year t under IBT2-10 
when customer j responds to average price (Equation 3.5); 
• 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡∗  is customer j’s projected water use under efficient pricing in year t;  
• 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2−10 is customer j’s water use under IBT2-10 in year t;  
• 𝐵𝐵1 is the size of the lifeline block under IBT2-10; and 
• 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2−10 is the volumetric price in block i under IBT2-10 in year t (i=1,2).  
Step 2: Calculate the change in consumer surplus associated with the transition from the 
baseline tariff to a new tariff.  
In the second step, we calculate the change in consumer surplus that results from a shift 
from the status quo tariff, a 4-block IBT (IBT4), to a variety of different tariffs as described in 
Equation A2.  
∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇4→𝑇𝑇 = ∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 − ∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇4 (A2) 
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where ∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇4→𝑇𝑇 is the change in consumer surplus associated with the shift from the status quo 
tariff to tariff alternative T in year t and ∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 and ∆𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇4 are the change in consumer surplus 
under tariff alternative T and IBT4, respectively, relative to efficient pricing in year t.  
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Appendix 3. Summary of Tariffs and Prices When Customers Respond to 
Marginal Price 
 
    Cost Recovery Scenario 
    31% 65% 100% 
Common Components         
Meter Rent USD/mo. 0.68 1.44 2.25 
Sewer surcharge* % 75% 75% 75% 
Annual price increase % 0% 16% 27% 
4-Block IBT (IBT4 - status quo)         
0 to 10 USD/m3 0.22 0.22 0.22 
11 to 30 USD/m3 0.45 0.45 0.45 
31 to 60 USD/m3 0.50 0.50 0.50 
> 60  USD/m3 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.30 0.30 
3-block IBT (IBT3)         
Block 1 UB m3/mo. 6 6 6 
Block 2 UB m3/mo. 60 60 60 
P Block 1 USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
P Block 2 USD/m3 0.37 0.78 1.21 
P Block 3 USD/m3 0.59 1.26 1.94 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.64 0.98 
2-Block IBT: 10 m3/mo. block 1 (IBT2-10)         
Size of LLB m3/mo. 10 10 10 
Price in LLB USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
Price in UB USD/m3 0.52 1.10 1.68 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.64 0.98 
2-Block IBT: 5 m3/mo. block 1 (IBT2-5)         
Size of LLB m3/mo. 5 5 5 
Price in LLB USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
Price in UB USD/m3 0.51 1.06 1.64 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.3 0.64 0.98 
Uniform Price (UP)         
Volumetric price USD/m3 0.46 0.98 1.51 
Uniform Price w/ Rebate (UP+R)         
Vol. price (water only) USD/m3 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Vol. price (water + wastewater) USD/m3 1.93 1.93 1.93 
Vol price (wastewater only) USD/m3 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Rebate USD/ac/mo. 37 5 -29 
* Except the UP+R tariff 
    
 
 
 
